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ex e C u T i v e su m m a r y
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, 
each of the transitioning countries faces 
the question of how to handle personnel 
inherited from preceding authoritarian 
regimes. Personnel reform is a critical 
aspect of political transitions and can 
affect a state’s security, legitimacy, and 
ability to function. Libya addressed 
this issue in 2013 with the adoption of 
its Political Isolation Law (PIL), which 
effectively disqualified anyone involved 
in Muammar Qaddafi’s regime from the 
new administration, armed forces, and 
other entities.
The PIL was passed with strong support in 
Libya’s parliament and under significant 
pressure from the country’s militias. The 
law is an example of an exclusive system, 
in which former regime officials are 
automatically banned from the new state 
apparatus. While this method is common, 
Libya’s democratization would be better 
served by a reconciliatory system that is 
based on the principle of the conditional 
second chance.
Personnel reforms usually seek to 
contribute to the establishment of a 
trustworthy government, political 
and social reconciliation, transitional 
justice, and human rights. An analysis of 
personnel reform in Eastern Europe and 
reconciliation in South Africa reveals 
that a reconciliatory approach is more 
likely than the PIL to accomplish these 
goals in Libya.
People in transitioning countries are more 
likely to trust their governments if they 
have purged compromised individuals, 
but an exclusionary system may merely 
reverse the roles of the regime and 
opposition. An exclusionary approach can 
also cripple countries like Libya that suffer 
from a lack of qualified professionals and 
talented political leaders, exposing them 
to the risk of becoming failed states. 
Reconciliatory approaches also increase 
trust in government and, through enabling 
the retention of qualified personnel, may 
boost the state’s performance and win 
further trust over time.
Reconciliation is badly needed in 
Libya, but the PIL is divisive and 
risks institutionalizing historical 
divisions. Considering the effects of 
de-Baathification in Iraq, the broad 
applicability of the PIL could realistically 
create new destabilizing elements in 
Libya by swelling the number of “losers” 
of the transition. Socially, the PIL 
effectively passes judgment on individuals 
and groups, putting them at risk of 
discrimination. Reconciliatory systems, 
conversely, have an enormous capacity to 
contribute to social reconciliation. They 
provide incentive for inherited personnel 
to make a commitment to the new regime 
and its rules.
Personnel reforms are motivated by past 
abuses of power and are measures of 
transitional justice. The PIL condemns 
the old regime and is to be implemented 
by independent lawyers using judicial 
procedures, but it may also create new 
injustices. It excludes large groups 
without considering individuals’ 
behavior, and bars excluded personnel 
from even non-government posts. 
Reconciliatory systems are based on 
confession and pursue restorative—
rather than retributive—justice. The PIL 
is more efficient in processing a large 
caseload, but it undermines social justice. 
Reconciliatory systems are more sensitive 
to individual redemption.
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Human rights are important to the internal 
and external legitimacy of the regime. By 
removing elected representatives from 
office, the PIL may violate citizens’ 
rights of representation as enumerated 
in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which Libya has 
signed. There are also questions over 
the rights of individuals to hold office 
and to not testify against themselves. 
The PIL should be subjected to a review 
to assess its conformity to international 
human rights standards. Conversely, A 
reconciliatory system is a human rights-
friendly approach that allows individuals 
to decide whether to pursue a position 
that requires exposure.
The Arab Spring countries continue to 
inf luence one another, and similarities 
can be seen in the personnel reform 
policies considered by Libya, Egypt, and 
Tunisia. Of those, Libya’s PIL is the most 
exclusionary, and its uncompromising 
logic may affect the political situation 
in pre-transition countries like Syria. 
It signals to Bashar al-Assad that he 
should reject compromise and warns 
opposition sympathizers that defecting 
may not benefit them. Reconciliatory 
methods can inspire other countries. 
While implementing them may seem 
unrealistic, particularly in the Middle 
East, it looked similarly daunting in 
South Africa, which has become an 
iconic model of political reconciliation. 
Libya now has an opportunity to provide 
a positive example.
Voices questioning the legitimacy of 
Libya’s revolution are growing louder 
as the country’s stalemate continues. 
The country faces major security issues 
and difficulty in building viable state 
institutions. The enactment of the PIL 
has further weakened Libya; even 
former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan has 
admitted the country is a failed state. The 
democratic transition is under threat.
Libya needs a broad coalition government 
that can agree on fundamental principles 
about the course of the country and major 
reforms, including personnel reform. 
Personnel reform—in order to serve the 
interests of the Libyan people—needs 
to be based on inclusion rather than 
exclusion and on reconciliation rather 
than revenge. A reconciliatory system 
is the only approach that can facilitate 
reconciliation, retain qualified personnel, 
uphold human rights standards, and serve 
as a positive example to others.
Democracy requires democratic political 
culture, and democratization should be 
accompanied by social transformation. 
The exclusive nature of the PIL inhibits 
such a transformation. It merely 
redistributes power and preserves the 
past conflict. The application of the 
PIL weakens the state and enlarges 
the ranks of its opponents. To promote 
democratic transformation, Libya and 
other transitioning countries would 
benefit from pursuing personal changes 
rather than personnel changes. Nearly 
three years after the fall of the Qaddafi 
regime, Libya again needs a fresh start. 
A reconciliatory system could provide it.
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Personnel reform of the state apparatus 
is undoubtedly one of the most critical 
political tasks in nascent democracies. 
The inability to address the problem 
of personnel inherited from past 
regimes can undermine the prospect for 
democratization, as shown by transitions 
in Chile in the 1990s, South Africa in 
1990-1994, and Slovakia in 1994-1998.1 
At the same time, personnel reforms may 
go wrong for a number of reasons. For 
instance, the law on background checks 
of public officials in Hungary has not 
prevented the old elite from using their 
contacts to enrich themselves, the vet-
ting program in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
circumvented the right to be heard, and 
the de-Baathification in Iraq has fuelled 
ethnic conflict.2
Yet, in spite of its import for policymakers, 
the topic of personnel policies has been 
neglected by academics. Scholars exam-
ine institutional choices in the constitu-
tional layout of the country, such as the 
advantages and problems of parliamen-
tary and presidential systems, unicameral 
and bicameral legislatures, majoritarian 
or proportional representation, and con-
sociational models.3 They discuss civilian 
control of the armed forces—a vital task 
in many post-military dictatorships4—
and enormous attention is devoted to the 
first democratic elections.5 This neglect 
of personnel reform is striking given the 
fact that it impacts security, the everyday 
operation of the state, and the legitimacy 
of state institutions to a similar extent as 
oversight of the military, constitutional 
models, and elections. 
Indeed, such a broad impact has been 
attributed to Libya’s PIL, which was 
passed under controversial circumstances 
in 2013. Libya’s newly elected General 
National Congress (GNC) approved the 
law to deal with inherited personnel, effec-
tively disqualifying anyone involved in 
the regime of Muammar Qaddafi between 
1969 and 2011 from the new administra-
tion and armed forces. Commentators 
have contended that the law undermines 
national reconciliation, violates human 
rights, derails democratization, destabi-
lizes internal and external security, and 
causes the collapse of numerous state 
functions and public services in post-
Qaddafi Libya.6
Thus, it seems that the prospect for demo-
cratic transition may be fatally hurt by 
the implementation of such personnel 
laws. The absence of personnel laws may 
do similar harm, resulting in abuses of 
power, violations of human rights, and a 
continued lack of trust in the government 
and armed forces. How to overcome this 
conundrum? This paper shall review the 
Libyan Political Isolation Law of 2013 in 
light of the objectives of personnel reforms 
in transitional democracies, and propose 
an alternative model that could better 
serve the interests of Libya’s democrati-
zation. It will contribute to the debate on 
personnel reform in nascent democracies 
in general and in Arab Spring countries in 
particular, providing a blueprint for other 
Arab Spring countries. The PIL follows 
the logic of traditional personnel policies 
which exclude, to varying degrees, former 
regime members, as in the examples of de-
Nazification in postwar Germany or the 
de-Baathification in post-Saddam Iraq. 
The proposed alternative is a reconcilia-
tory approach based on the observation of 
major institutional innovations in Eastern 
Europe,7 where the principle of the condi-
tional second chance emerged.
in T r o d u C T i o n
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Libya’s Political Isolation Law, officially 
Legislation No. 13 of 2013 of the Political 
and Administrative Isolation, was passed 
by the GNC on May 14, 2013 and came 
into force on June 5, 2013. The GNC is 
a 200-member unicameral legislature 
which was freely elected in 2012 national 
elections. Owing to the body’s electoral 
system, independent candidates were 
awarded 120 seats, while the National 
Alliance Forces of Mahmoud Jibril, which 
won the largest share of votes with 48 per-
cent, received 39 seats. Finishing second, 
the Justice and Construction Party, which 
is the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s 
political party, won 17 seats for its 10 
percent of votes. Some 164 MPs voted 
for the legislation, 4 were against, and 19 
were absent from the vote, 
which aired on Libyan state 
television.8
The PIL was passed at a 
time when the number of 
Libyan voices in favor of 
purging Qaddafi loyalists 
was growing. It came amidst 
calls from the Libyan public 
to ban anyone who worked 
under the Qaddafi regime. 
Colonel Qaddafi became 
the the de facto leader of 
the country after heading 
a coup-d’etat against King 
Idris on September 1, 1969. 
Through his comrades in 
the Free Unionist Officers, 
Qaddafi proclaimed the 
Libyan Arab Republic, later establish-
ing a socialist-populist jamahiriya, or 
“republic of the masses,” as he termed it. 
The regime spied on ordinary Libyans, 
suppressed opposition, detained dissent-
ers, and imprisoned and tortured those 
suspected of acting “against the revolu-
tion of September 1st, 1969.” Qaddafi’s 
rule lasted for more than 40 years, but 
in February 2011, following revolutions 
in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, large 
numbers of Libyans rose up against the 
authoritarian regime. After months of 
civil conflict, Qaddafi was driven from 
power and ultimately killed in October 
2011.
The PIL’s aim was to rid the Libyan 
political scene of people who worked 
directly or indirectly for the Qaddafi 
regime. Opponents of the law considered 
it to be excessive and punitive, but its 
proponents argued that it was necessary 
to bar those who participated in prolong-
ing the Qaddafi regime for 
over four decades. The GNC 
passed the law shortly after 
the April 2013 attack on the 
French embassy, (which 
followed the attack on the 
U.S. Consulate in Benghazi 
in September 2012), in an 
atmosphere of growing 
discontent. It passed while 
armed militias had placed 
the GNC under a military 
siege. The militias concur-
rently blocked a number of 
other ministerial buildings 
in Tripoli and were actively 
intimidating individual 
members of the GNC. The 
involvement of the armed 
militias raises serious ques-
tions about the legitimacy of the law.
The PIL disqualifies anyone who held any 
of the state apparatus positions listed in 
Article 1, Category 1 of the law between 
September 1, 1969 and October 23, 2011 
Th e Po l i T i C a l is o l a T i o n la w a n d i T s 
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The PIL was passed 
at a time when the 
number of Libyan 
voices in favor of 
purging Qaddafi 
loyalists was 
growing. It came 
amidst calls from the 
Libyan public to ban 
anyone who worked 
under the Qaddafi 
regime.
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from holding any public positions in the 
new government. The disqualifying posi-
tions specified include leading politi-
cal, administrative, and security posts; 
ambassadors; chancellors of universities; 
heads of student unions; researchers at 
propaganda institutes; and anyone who 
belonged to an international organization 
that threatened Libya. The law also dis-
qualifies those who exhibited the behav-
iors listed in Category 2, which it says led 
to “the corruption” of political, economic, 
and administrative life in the country.” 
The list includes collaboration with the 
regime resulting in human rights viola-
tions, glorification of the Qaddafi regime, 
taking a hostile position to the 2011 revo-
lution, committing criminal offenses, and 
using religion to support the regime.
Article 2 specifies the range of positions 
that disqualified personnel cannot hold, 
but some are incompatible with positions 
listed in Article 1. Article 2 includes not 
only leading state, administrative, and 
security positions, but also membership 
in judicial and legislative bodies, as well 
as leadership in the media, universities, 
and political parties. The law is admin-
istered by a special Commission for 
Implementing the Political Isolation Law 
Standards. Its members are supposed to 
be Libyan nationals older than 35 years of 
age with legal training but without politi-
cal affiliation, as stipulated in Article 5.
The PIL belongs to the category of exclu-
sive personnel systems.9 Exclusive sys-
tems are defined as personnel systems 
which provide for the automatic exclu-
sion of officials associated with the old 
regime from the state apparatus of the 
new regime. Though common, the dis-
missal of inherited personnel from the 
state apparatus is not the only path of per-
sonnel reform in transitional countries. 
Research has overlooked the significance 
of some Central European experiences 
with lustration laws. Lustration laws can 
be defined as special public employment 
laws that regulate the participation of 
people associated with the former regime 
in the successor political system.10 While 
scholars have viewed personnel laws 
through a prism of lesser or greater exclu-
sions,11 they have disregarded this major 
institutional innovation, which introduces 
an entirely new dimension to the resolu-
tion of the personnel conundrum.12 While 
unified Germany, the Czech Republic, 
and many other countries oscillated in 
the degree of exclusion, Hungary and 
Poland have employed a variety of inclu-
sive methods. Through these methods the 
discredited personnel have been given a 
second chance: they could retain public 
employment under particular conditions.
The condition for retaining public office 
under the Hungarian “inclusive” person-
nel system was exposure. People associ-
ated with the old regime were given the 
option to either resign or to have their past 
roles and activities publicized. The new 
government could thus retain the quali-
fied personnel and establish transpar-
ency. Empirical evidence shows that the 
method of exposure has positive, though 
marginal, effects on establishing trust in 
government.13 The positive gains resulting 
from the transparency of government are 
counter-balanced by two negative factors. 
First, the shaming of government officials 
by their exposure raises the question of 
why these people are not dismissed right 
away. Second, almost all of the exposed 
officials deny, downplay, or excuse their 
involvement in the past.
The Polish “reconciliatory” personnel 
system offered a considerably more prom-
ising avenue than Hungary’s simple inclu-
sive system. It also applied the principle 
of the second chance, but was based on 
the confession of the inherited personnel. 
A person who aspired to hold a public 
post had to submit an affidavit that dis-
closed all relevant activities and positions 
in the past regime. As the essence of the 
affidavits was published, the public had 
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an opportunity to scrutinize them. A spe-
cial prosecutor then verified the affidavits 
and, if a case raised suspicion, he or she 
handed it to the court, which made the 
final decision about its completeness. If 
the individual disclosed all relevant facts, 
he was given a second chance to hold 
public office. If he concealed any fact, he 
was dismissed and barred from holding a 
public post for ten years. Thus, collabo-
rating with the previous regime did not 
result in exclusion in Poland; only subse-
quently lying about past collaboration led 
to dismissal.
The Polish reconciliatory personnel 
system resembles the South African 
truth and reconciliation process.14 While 
in Poland tainted personnel were given 
an opportunity to hold a public post in 
exchange for self-revelation, in South 
Africa gross human rights violators were 
offered amnesty for making a full disclo-
sure of all relevant facts. Both countries 
thus incorporated the authentic personal 
experience of confessing wrongdoing into 
an essentially macro-political process to 
smooth complicated political transitions.
In reconciliatory systems, self-revelation 
serves as a loyalty test. It provides the 
inherited personnel with an opportunity 
to demonstrate that they are disassociat-
ing themselves from the old regime and 
are willing to play by the rules of the new 
regime. It is a forum where they can pub-
licly explain their past actions and motives 
and express that they have learned from 
their experiences and are changing their 
attitudes. Indeed, many people may have 
been forced to collaborate with authori-
tarian regimes and may not have gained 
anything from their collaboration.
The reconciliatory method can be imple-
mented in various forms. Self-revelation 
can take the form of written submis-
sions, public hearings, an oath, or some 
combination of the three. In Libya, self-
revelation could stem from cultural and 
religious practices. Every culture stipu-
lates conditions for repentance, such as 
the Islamic concept of tawba, involving 
expressions of remorse and promises to 
not return to previous, immoral actions. 
The revelations can be verified through 
a judicial system, a broad-based political 
or parliamentary commission, or partici-
pation of the public, which would come 
forward with any relevant information. 
Various models of the reconciliatory 
system have already been proposed for 
Iraq15 and Myanmar.16
7Personnel Change or Personal Change? rethinking libya’s PolitiCal isolation law
Having reviewed the types of personnel 
reform systems, the question of which 
model best serves Libya’s democratization 
can be examined. Public policies are tra-
ditionally assessed against 
whether they accomplish 
their purported objectives, 
but many have unintended 
consequences that may not 
have been desired or dis-
cussed. We shall therefore 
assess the competing per-
sonnel policies in light of the 
objectives identified in the 
available literature. Based 
on our literature review, we 
can distinguish five clus-
ters of goals, effects, and 
areas of impact that tran-
sitional personnel reforms 
may have: establishment 
of a trustworthy govern-
ment, political and social reconciliation, 
justice, human rights, and international 
impact.17 We can thus examine the exclu-
sionary PIL and reconciliatory alterna-
tives against the extent to which similar 
systems have achieved these objectives. 
To assess the likelihood of success, we 
draw on analyses of personnel reforms 
in Eastern Europe and the reconciliation 
process in South Africa.18
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
TRUSTWORTHY GOVERNMENT
Trustworthy administration and security 
forces are cornerstones of any democratic 
system. To ensure political stability and 
security, governments need laws, politi-
cal decisions, and programs to be imple-
mented by bureaucracy and armed forces 
that are loyal, professional, and efficient. 
Ideally, citizens would have confidence 
that the government and members of the 
state apparatus are bound by law and will 
not act against their inter-
ests.19 Trustworthy govern-
ments can better implement 
policies, enforce security, 
and collect taxes than gov-
ernments facing a crisis 
of public confidence. The 
establishment of a trustwor-
thy government is an even 
more pressing and daunting 
task in societies undergoing 
transitions from authoritar-
ian rule after experiencing 
years of abuses of political 
power.20
In stable democracies, 
exclusive personnel systems 
would be the most efficient method of 
reforming the state administration and 
armed forces. Empirical research in tran-
sitional countries shows that new govern-
ment and security departments are better 
off without those who have been compro-
mised in the past.21 Clearly, victims of the 
Qaddafi regime would not like to seek 
assistance from those officials who per-
secuted them in the first place. In addition 
to these positives, however, exclusive per-
sonnel systems have several drawbacks.
The first problem is that personnel change 
does not guarantee a change of political 
methods. Widespread dismissals can win 
trust in the government among the former 
opposition but they can hardly reach the 
entire society. Without additional reforms, 
an exclusionary system merely leads 
the former opposition and the former 
as s e s s i n g T h e Pil a n d i T s 
re C o n C i l i a T o r y al T e r n a T i v e s
The establishment 
of a trustworthy 
government is an 
even more pressing 
and daunting task in 
societies undergoing 
transitions from 
authoritarian rule 
after experiencing 
years of abuse in 
power.
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government to switch roles.22 The regime 
may change but the methods of politi-
cal exclusions remain in place. Indeed, 
an observer pointed out the similarity 
between the PIL and the Revolutionary 
Committees established by Qaddafi in 
1969.23 The Revolutionary Committees 
set up by Qaddafi could be compared to 
the Stasi system set up by East Germany’s 
Communist regime. These committees 
aimed to control the daily lives of the 
Libyan people and monitor dissent against 
the Qaddafi’s regime.
The second problem is that most transi-
tional countries—with the notable excep-
tion of unified Germany—do not have a 
sufficient number of qualified profession-
als available to replace large parts of the 
state apparatus. This has been the case in 
Libya, which according to former Prime 
Minister Ali Zeidan (who may be affected 
by the law) lost a lot of middle manage-
ment experts due to the application of 
the law, weakening already fragile state 
institutions.24 
Finally, the PIL depletes the pool of 
political leaders. Prominent leaders play 
an important role in democratic transi-
tions. They are sources of 
personalized trust during the 
interim period before formal 
trust in government institu-
tions is established. Libya 
does not have an abundance 
of political talent; there is no 
Aung San Suu Kyi, Nelson 
Mandela, Vaclav Havel, 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, or 
Muhammad ElBaradei who 
can speak to the masses 
and is known beyond the 
region. The resignation of 
Muhammad Magariaf, the first permanent 
chairman of the GNC, may be an example 
of such a loss of talent. Magariaf was the 
President of the Government Accounting 
Office and the Ambassador to India in the 
1970s before defecting and co-founding 
the opposition National Front for the 
Salvation of Libya in 1981. He became 
head of parliament in August 2012, but 
resigned from his post shortly after the 
PIL was passed.25
Concern over the loss of political talent 
was echoed in an interview with Hajer al-
Gaied, a GNC member from the National 
Alliance Forces (NAF).26 Although she 
was a member of the commission charged 
with implementing the Political Isolation 
Law Standards, she found the final ver-
sion of the law too excessive because it 
reached non-political positions such as 
those in academia, and was unfair to many 
“Libyan patriots.” In her view, the way the 
PIL is being implemented will “deprive 
Libya of good and honest Libyans such 
as Mustafa Abduljalil (former president 
of the National Transitional Council) and 
Mahmoud Jibril (president of NAF).”
Another interviewees, an academic who 
originally supported the PIL, said he 
already found the law too excessive in 
general terms. He added, “At one point, 
we realized that there were people who 
wanted to isolate school teachers when we 
meant it to ... isolate the military, security, 
and diplomatic personnel who ideologi-
cally supported the former 
regime and participated in 
its duration.”27
Like exclusionary policies, 
a reconciliatory system is 
perfectly capable of estab-
lishing trust in govern-
ment. Unlike in an inclusive 
system, the effect of a con-
fession of a government offi-
cial on establishing trust in 
government is significantly 
positive in a dataset from 
the three countries in Central Europe,28 
though it may be considerably weaker 
than that of dismissals.29 It is not surpris-
ing that a government department that 
dismisses a compromised member may be 
viewed in a better light than a department 
Most transitional 
countries do not 
have a sufficient 
number of qualified 
professionals 
available to replace 
large parts of the 
state apparatus.
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that retains such a member, even if he 
has completed a proscribed reconciliation 
process. In the long term, however, pro-
viding an acceptable path for the inclusion 
of compromised, but qualified, personnel 
into the new administration may boost the 
state’s ability to function and provide ser-
vices, thereby winning public trust.
The implementation of a reconciliatory 
system does not suggest that Qaddafi loy-
alists should retain leading posts in new 
Libya. Such a system would not suspend 
the standard selection criteria for hiring 
members of public administration and 
armed forces. It would merely provide 
conditions for incorporating those experts, 
professionals, and experienced personnel 
who are deemed qualified for the post but 
were in some capacity at a certain point 
in history associated with the Qaddafi 
regime. A reconciliatory system would 
not limit political leaders in their attempt 
to select particular officials for state posi-
tions. The PIL certainly does. 
 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
RECONCILIATION
Reconciliation should be considered an 
imperative of personnel reforms in soci-
eties that are overcoming deep histori-
cal divisions. Inherited divisions can be 
identified at the macro-political level and 
at the social level, and each have distinct 
social dynamics that impact reconcilia-
tion. At the macro level, political elites 
should agree on basic principles of politi-
cal struggle, such as non-violence, respect 
for election results, and adherence to the 
rule of law. At the societal level, recon-
ciliation comprises inclusiveness, trust, 
and tolerance.30 The prospect for rec-
onciliation in Libya is hindered both by 
grievances from Qaddafi’s reign and more 
recent scars acquired in the aftermath of 
the regime change. Deep resentment, 
tribal divisions, and internal conflicts in 
the GNC and the government are among 
the major inhibitors of reconciliation at 
the political and social levels.
At the political level, the PIL is very divi-
sive. Critics pointed out that the PIL insti-
tutionalizes historical divisions, even ones 
that were originally artificial. The law 
does not accurately reflect reality since 
it excludes anyone who had at any time 
worked in the Qaddafi regime, even if he 
emigrated, defected from the regime, sup-
ported the uprising, or all three. It adopts a 
rigid conception of human nature, assum-
ing that all people somewhat associated 
with the Qaddafi regime are unchangeable 
and incapable of moral development. The 
law also labels as enemies those who are 
not enemies in the first place. In view of 
the consequences that de-Baathification 
had in Iraq, it is not far-fetched to say the 
law has the capacity to transform allies 
into enemies.
The PIL also has the potential to aggra-
vate the so-called “spoiler problem.” 
According to Stephen Stedman, who 
coined the concept, the biggest risk to 
peace comes from various leaders and 
parties who emerge after a civil war 
ends.31 If these actors believe the ongo-
ing transition threatens their interests 
they will consequently try to undermine 
the peace. This problem has been identi-
fied in Egypt where a variety of spoilers 
operate: from limited spoilers— who seek 
a share of power within a constitutional 
framework—to total spoilers, who see the 
world in all-or-nothing terms.32 In Libya, 
the PIL would swell the number of losers 
of the transition by depriving former 
regime members the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the new system. The enforce-
ment of the PIL would even isolate some 
of the original winners of transition, espe-
cially the militias, from the rest of the 
population. The prospect for the militias 
to enter the democratic process would 
become increasingly difficult, given their 
unpopularity.
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At the societal level, the law impacts 
the public perception of the people who 
are penalized by its implementation. It 
effectively passes judgment on the social 
standing of the excluded person, labeling 
him or her as a persona non grata.33 This 
may lead to further social exclusion and 
discrimination against the person in the 
labor market, or, depending on his or her 
social status, may turn the person’s entire 
social group—such as a tribe or a politi-
cal party—against the proponents of the 
law.34 Reconciliation is thus undermined 
by the individual as well as collective 
consequences of the law. 
An interview with Abdulhakim Mounem, 
a Libyan civil society activist, was par-
ticularly telling.35 His opposition to the 
law was very much guided by human 
rights ideals and abstract principles of 
justice. In his view, “the PIL was done to 
exclude political opponents from the NAF 
and to benefit parties such as Justice and 
Construction Party (an Islamist party). 
These were illegitimate, undemocratic, 
and unethical practices.” Mounem went 
on to criticize the exclusion of Mahmoud 
Jibril, the head of the NAF, who is from 
the same hometown and tribe, in a clear 
demonstration of how sowing divisions 
between leaders spills over to society and 
polarizes their followers.
Reconciliatory systems have an enormous 
capacity to contribute to social reconcili-
ation. The only way for inherited person-
nel to be incorporated into the new regime 
is to forge an agreement with the former 
opposition about the illegitimacy of the 
former regime. This presumes unequivo-
cally distancing oneself from the previous 
regime and demonstrating a commitment 
to the new regime and its rules. The rec-
onciliatory tone at the macro-political 
level is likely to reverberate at the indi-
vidual level. Similar “spill over” effects 
have been observed in the reconciliation 
process in South Africa. Although the 
South African reconciliatory process con-
cerned a limited number of cases, it has 
been able to inspire reconciliation in the 
entire society.36 
The reconciliatory system, however, is 
vulnerable to fundamentalist politics, 
which can appeal for a principled stance 
and offer swift, uncompromising solu-
tions. Its application requires either strong 
leadership or a broad collation of political 
forces, both being supported by prominent 
players in society. In other words, the rec-
onciliatory system in itself cannot deliver 
reconciliation, but can give it a significant 
boost when the political will to reconcile is 
present. For instance, South Africa was on 
the verge of civil war and territorial disin-
tegration before the Kempton Park nego-
tiations paved the way for amnesty and the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.37 
The cessation of violence and the end of 
secessionist tendencies in the Free State 
and in KwaZulu-Natal are evidence that 
at least minimal social reconciliation has 
taken place. On the other hand, political 
parties in Poland always undermined the 
process of lustration; some viewed it as 
being too excessive, while others saw it as 
insufficient. The inability of major politi-
cal actors on the left as well as the right to 
honor barely-reached agreements weak-
ened the implementation of the system in 
Poland.
 
JUSTICE
Transitional personnel reforms are moti-
vated by the abuses of power of previous 
regimes. Thus, they may inevitably be 
seen as corrective measures which aim to 
rectify the deficiencies and injustices of 
the past. Although they do not take effect 
at the level of criminal law, they may be 
considered measures of transitional jus-
tice, whether they aspire to achieve mini-
mal justice,38 non-criminal sanctions,39 
or administrative justice.40 Undoubtedly, 
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the PIL can be considered a measure of 
transitional justice. It is a response to the 
injustices of the Qaddafi era, during which 
the selection of personnel for public posi-
tions was restricted by political criteria 
and allegiances, be they personal, tribal, 
or as a reward for a rendered service. The 
PIL sends a clear signal of condemning 
the old regime and its practices. On the 
positive side, the law is gov-
erned by judicial procedures 
(Article 9) and is supposed 
to be implemented by inde-
pendent legal professionals 
(Article 5). Yet several sub-
stantive provisions of the 
law appear excessive as they 
even bar excluded person-
nel from posts far beyond 
the state apparatus. Such 
positions include the “chair-
manship and membership of 
governing bodies of politi-
cal parties, entities, institu-
tions, and Commissions of a 
political nature,” the presidency of higher 
education institutions, and “leadership 
positions in various media and publish-
ing institutes” (Article 2). These are non-
state posts which should not be regulated 
by what is effectively a special public 
employment law.41
Concerns about creating new injus-
tices were apparent in an interview with 
Muhammad Younes Toumi, another 
supporter-turned-opponent of the law.42 
As a member of the GNC, Toumi headed 
the commission charged with drafting the 
Political Isolation Law Standards. He later 
became disillusioned, however, with the 
way it was manipulated by some political 
entities as well as public figures, such as 
Libya’s grand mufti Sadegh al-Ghariyani. 
Toumi also deplored the pressure from 
some media outlets and young rebels 
who wanted to turn the law into a tool of 
oppression. Consequently, he resigned 
from the commission. “The law does not 
meet my expectations,” Toumi explained. 
“It should facilitate and support national 
reconciliation and transitional justice. But 
the fact that it excludes a large section of 
people without considering their behav-
ior, I can consider it as unfair.”
Assessing the alternative model in light of 
justice requires going beyond the notion of 
retributive justice. Reconciliatory systems 
are based on confession, 
which can be viewed as a 
method of restorative justice 
or a form of sanctions that 
are alternative to dismissal. 
The ability of alternative 
sanctions to deliver justice 
depends on their expressive 
power.43 What messages 
do these measures convey? 
How convincing are they? 
Dismissals clearly signal 
that a particular behavior 
is unacceptable, while con-
fessions signal a change in 
behavior and moral devel-
opment of the individual. Empirical 
research shows that confession increases 
the positive perception of the public about 
justice, although this increase is consider-
ably smaller than the effect of dismissal.44 
Another dimension of justice is its proce-
dural character. A transitional justice mea-
sure may be viewed as fair in its essence 
but it may violate due process guarantees. 
Clearly, the PIL is based on sweeping col-
lective dismissals, while reconciliatory 
systems adopt an individual approach. 
The former is undoubtedly more effective 
in processing a larger number of cases in 
a short time span, but it also carries the 
larger social risk of creating new injus-
tices. By collectively labeling the former 
personnel as tainted, it effectively inhib-
its their prospects for participating in the 
labor market, undermining social justice. 
To be sure, the claim that those who ben-
efitted in the past should not retain their 
privileged public positions may be legiti-
mate, but people who underwent a change 
of heart a long time ago and defected or 
Reconciliation 
systems are based 
on confession, 
which can be viewed 
as a method of 
restorative justice or 
a form of sanctions 
that are alternative 
to dismissal.
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criticized the Qaddafi regime, such as 
Magariaf and Abdul Jalil, are effectively 
“punished” by the law as well. Hence, 
reconciliatory systems, with their case-
by-case approach, are more sensitive to 
individual redemption than the PIL, which 
treats anyone associated with the former 
regime as unchangeable and intractable.  
 
HUMAN RIGHTS
The need to uphold human rights may 
seem a controversial demand in the eyes 
of those who have been disappointed with 
the human rights record of major Western 
powers after September 2001. Nowadays 
we can observe that countries which advo-
cate for human rights kill without trial, 
detain without trial, and torture detainees. 
Yet the political hypocrisy cannot com-
promise the principle itself. Human rights 
still matter for the internal and external 
legitimacy of the regime. Personnel 
reform may impact human 
rights of the inherited per-
sonnel as well as the victims 
of the former regime.
Libya is a party to the 
International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of 
1976, but the PIL infringes 
on the right to vote as it 
concerns the members of 
the GNC.45 By eliminating 
elected representatives it 
invalidates the active right 
of citizens to vote and be 
represented by a particu-
lar deputy, and the passive 
right of the deputies to hold 
elected positions. In doing 
so, it effectively alters the 
outcomes of elections and modifies the 
parameters of the free political contest. 
Moreover, the questionnaires that are col-
lected from persons holding public posi-
tions may violate the right to not testify 
against oneself.46
On the other hand, some of the criticisms 
of human rights groups seem to be too 
harsh. Although the PIL violates some 
human rights, there is not a right to be 
appointed to public office and to public 
employment. Article 25 of the covenant 
allows reasonable restrictions of the 
right to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs. Although countries should not dis-
criminate in employment,47 the European 
jurisdiction, for instance, takes into 
account the particular historical situation 
in a country under scrutiny.48 It is also 
significant that the UN vetting program in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina did not conform 
to human rights standards.49 Most notably, 
in order to facilitate a speedy reform of 
the police force, the program suspended 
the right to be heard and relaxed the stan-
dard of proof.50
To assess the PIL’s conformity to inter-
national human rights standards, it would 
be very useful to subject it, the process 
of its approval, and its application to a 
judicial or constitutional 
review. The NAF and some 
human rights activists and 
lawyers have actually come 
forward to challenge the law 
at the Constitutional Court. 
According to Hajer al-Gaied, 
an NAF GNC member, the 
court should also look into 
allegations that the final 
wording of the enacted law 
was manipulated and did not 
match its approved version.
A reconciliatory system 
is a human rights-friendly 
model of personnel systems. 
Although the Polish recon-
ciliatory method was chal-
lenged at its Constitutional 
Tribunal on the pretext that the affidavits 
submitted as conditions for public employ-
ment violated the right of the applicants 
to not testify against themselves, the court 
rejected that claim. It convincingly argued 
that this right could not be violated since 
To assess the PIL’s 
conformity to 
international human 
rights standards, 
it would be very 
useful to subject 
it, the process of 
its approval, and 
its application 
to a judicial or 
constiutitonal 
review.
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merely testifying did not constitute a pro-
hibition to hold public office. The appli-
cants would be barred from holding office 
if their testimonies were incomplete, 
inaccurate, or untruthful, but the law did 
not force the applicants to be dishonest. 
Moreover, the applicants for public office 
decided, on their own election, to undergo 
the process during which they subjected 
themselves to exposure. Finally, it has 
been recognized that the scope of privacy 
for public officials is considerably smaller 
than in cases of private citizens.51
 
INTERNATIONAL IMPACT
Political transitions among neighbor-
ing countries often affect one another. 
This so-called “contagion effect was 
first described in Latin America.52 The 
existence of such effects can hardly be 
doubted in the Arab Spring countries, 
which continue to influence and inspire 
one another. We can expect that a major 
policy adopted in one country would 
be emulated or avoided in another. An 
observable resemblance among a cluster 
of countries eventually emarges in one 
region, although it would be impossible 
to claim a causal link of influence in com-
plex political processes involving many 
actors. 
The PIL affects and is affected by the 
situation in neighboring countries. It may 
have been inspired by a similar exclu-
sionary law in Egypt with the same name. 
The Egyptian Political Isolation Law was 
approved in 2011 before it was invalidated 
by the country’s Supreme Constitutional 
Court the following year. A similar law was 
adopted in neighboring Tunisia in 2013. 
Although less exclusionary than Libya’s 
PIL, Tunisia’s “Law for the Immunization 
of the Revolution” seeks to bar persons 
who worked in prescribed capacities in 
the Ben Ali regime or  the former ruling 
party during the past ten years from hold-
ing office under the new government or 
leading a political party for six to seven 
years.53 Curiously enough, shortly after 
Libya began to apply the PIL, the support-
ers of the Immunization Law in Tunisia 
backed down. The Immunization Law 
is currently suspended and may not be 
enforced before the next parliamentary 
elections, which are tentatively scheduled 
for 2014.
The contagion effect is not necessarily 
limited to legal development. The uncom-
promising logic of the PIL may also affect 
the political situation in pre-transition 
countries like Syria. It may send a signal 
to the regime of Bashar al-Assad to ignore 
calls for dialogue and to fight to the very 
end. Once gross human rights violations 
are committed, the threat of facing retribu-
tion may lead to defiance, not deterrence. 
It also sends a signal to opposition sympa-
thizers within the government ranks that 
defecting from the regime will not guar-
antee them a role in a future state. Once 
they are tainted, they may be excluded 
and punished in the future, regardless of 
their support for the opposition. 
Reconciliatory methods can become an 
inspiration for other countries in the 
region and beyond. Middle East politics, 
characterized by strife and revenge, seem 
to be in urgent need of reconciliation. The 
events in Egypt in 2012-13 show yet again 
that one group cannot use force to prevail 
over another. To be sure, implementing 
a reconciliatory system may seem unre-
alistic in many countries. The prospect 
for any reconciliatory scenario in South 
Africa and Poland looked unrealistic, 
especially given the state of emergency 
both countries experienced in the 1980s, 
as well as their complicated transitions.54 
Yet both South Africa in 1996-2001 and 
Poland in 1999-2005 were able to imple-
ment reconciliatory systems.55 The South 
African truth and reconciliation process 
has since become an iconic model of 
political reconciliation. If Libya were to 
embrace a reconciliatory system, it too 
could provide an example for the future.
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More than two years after the death of 
Qaddafi, the voices questioning the very 
legitimacy of the Libyan revolution are 
growing louder in light of the country’s 
continuing stalemate. Libya faces increas-
ing insecurity, uncertainty about its 
future, and difficulty in building a stable 
state apparatus with a viable police force, 
army, and judiciary. Libya’s prospects for 
democratization are significantly hindered 
by the inability of any political force to 
control the armed militias that often target 
civilians, be they Qaddafi loyalists or 
opponents. The state apparatus, the police, 
and the army are too weak to secure order, 
which is the most essential 
function of the state. The 
operation of the state has 
been further weakened by 
the enactment of the PIL. 
Continued implementation 
of the PIL puts Libya at risk 
of becoming a failed state. 
The brief abduction of 
former Prime Minister Ali 
Zeidan in October 2013 
prompted many Libyans to 
question the competence 
of the representatives they 
elected two years prior and 
to doubt the possibility of building viable 
state institutions. The fact that some 
politicians, including Zeidan himself, 
openly admit that Libya is a failed state 
confirms the government’s helplessness 
in restoring security. Zeidan’s opponents, 
including Muhammad Savan, the leader 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, and a group 
of ultra-conservative Salafis, are capital-
izing on the security lapse.56 If the prime 
minister is not safe, how can an average 
Libyan citizen protect himself from the 
threats these militias pose? The demo-
cratic transition in Libya is under threat. 
Libya appears to be in need of a broad 
coalition government that would agree on 
fundamental principles about the course 
of the country and major reforms, includ-
ing the demobilization of the armed mili-
tia and the personnel reform of the state 
apparatus. Forging such a coalition would 
hardly be possible without the involvement 
of and discussion among major interna-
tional actors, including the United States, 
France, the United Kingdom, and Qatar. It 
would be nearly impossible if the efforts 
of one of these actors are undermined by 
its allies. An international mediation that 
could help Libyans create 
another type of transitional 
council or a broader coali-
tion government seems an 
inevitable precondition to 
pursue security and person-
nel reform. 
Whether managed domes-
tically or with the help of 
foreign countries, personnel 
reform—in order to serve 
the interests of the Libyan 
people—needs to be based 
on inclusion rather than 
exclusion and on reconciliation rather 
than revenge.57 The implementation of a 
reconciliatory personnel system would 
meet those expectations, providing a 
number of advantages (see Appendix). 
Although a reconciliatory system may ini-
tially score lower in delivering trust and 
justice, it is the only system that would 
be able to facilitate reconciliation, retain 
qualified personnel, uphold human rights 
standards, and serve as a positive example 
to others.58 
The operation of 
the state has been 
further weakened 
by the enactment of 
the PIL. Continued 
implementation of 
the PIL puts Libya 
at risk of becoming a 
failed state.
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The issue of personnel reform goes 
beyond the scorecard of its advantages 
and disadvantages and underpins a 
broader political and social transforma-
tion. Democratization cannot be reduced 
to organizing democratic elections, writ-
ing a new constitution, and building 
political institutions. Formal rules are 
conditions that are necessary but not suf-
ficient for democracy. It is not unusual 
for elections, which are declared free 
and fair, to result in leadership that pub-
licly opposes democracy and peace.59 
Democracy requires democratic political 
culture, amenability to compromise, and 
respect for human rights. It follows that if 
democracy requires democratic political 
culture, then democratization should be 
accompanied by social transformation. 
The exclusive nature of the Political 
Isolation Law effectively inhibits such 
a social transformation. Similar to elec-
tions, it merely redistributes power and 
enables the former opposition to gain 
control of the state apparatus. In doing 
so, it preserves the past conflict with the 
new actors finding themselves in the old 
process of exclusion. Political leaders 
and legions of bureaucrats, who have the 
expertise and willingness to contribute 
to the new system, are disqualified from 
political participation. The application of 
the PIL weakens the state and enlarges the 
ranks of its opponents. 
In order to promote democratic transfor-
mation, Libya and other transitional coun-
tries would benefit from pursuing personal 
changes rather than personnel changes. 
A reconciliatory system can serve as a 
vehicle of such a transformation. It gives 
tainted officials an opportunity to publicly 
demonstrate whether they are willing to 
play by the rules of the new system. Such 
process is not foreign to Arab culture and 
is in accordance with the Islamic teaching 
on tawba. Observing the drama of confes-
sion, the public has a unique opportunity 
to scrutinize the motives and actions of 
the officials, engage in a dialogue over 
the past, and come to terms with their own 
past. South Africa—a country that was 
deeply divided along racial, religious, 
political, and social lines and experienced 
a brutal regime and violent transition—
shows this is not merely an idealistic hope 
but a realistic option.
The public nature of a reconciliatory pro-
cess would bring additional advantages. 
Reform of the armed forces and state 
administration includes “soft tasks such 
as overcoming the perception of their 
association with the former regime.”60 
Revelations of inherited personnel, scruti-
nized for their authenticity by a transpar-
ent process with public participation, may 
provide the new government with a degree 
of legitimacy and enough breathing space 
to consolidate the state apparatus. Nearly 
three years after the fall of the Qaddafi 
regime, Libya again needs a fresh start. 
A reconciliatory system could provide it.
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aP P e n d i x: 
ad v a n T a g e s a n d di s a d v a n T a g e s o f  Pe r s o n n e l sy s T e m s
 
 Exclusive System: The 
Political Isolation Law 
Reconciliatory System: The 
Proposed Model 
1. Building 
trustworthy 
government 
(+) Effective in building 
trustworthy government  
 
(-) Trust is limited to the sections 
of the former opposition 
(-) Deprives the state of 
experienced personnel  
(-) Deprives the country of 
political leaders (personalized 
trust) 
(+) Capable of building 
trustworthy government, albeit 
less efficient 
(+) Trust can stem from all 
sections of society 
(+) Retains qualified personnel, 
which may win trust by effective 
delivery of services 
 
2. Reconciliation (-) Politically divisive  
(-) Political divisions spill over to 
society 
(+) Reconciliatory effects on the 
macro-level (smoothing political 
compromise) 
(+) Reconciliatory effects on the 
micro-level 
3. Justice (+) A response to the injustices of 
the Qaddafi era 
 
(-) Excessive provisions create 
new injustices  
(+) Alternative means of justice 
(restorative justice) 
4. Human Rights (+) There is no right to be 
appointed to public office; public 
employment can be limited by 
law 
 
(-) Violates the right not to testify 
against oneself and the right to 
vote 
(+) Human rights friendly model 
(+) Confession does not violate the 
right not to testify because it leads 
to the second chance rather than 
constituting sanctions  
5. Contagion (-) Sends a signal to those 
dissatisfied with any pre-
transitional regime not to defect  
(+) Capacity to inspire other Arab 
countries 
 
(+) Indicates an advantage 
(-) Indicates a disadvantage 
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